democracy, human rights nonsense, international relations, intervention

Human Rights Nonsense (43): Self-Determination

This is about the right to democracy. I’ve argued many times in favor of such a right. In fact, if you read the texts of the major international human rights treaties and declarations, you’ll see that democratic rule is listed as part of the set of human rights. That’s not just an argument from authority; there are many good philosophical and practical arguments that speak for this right. However, I won’t discuss those arguments now since I want to focus on a counter-argument, more specifically a counter-argument that is based on another right, namely the right to self-determination.

There are perhaps better counter-arguments than this one. In fact, I believe it’s a very bad counter-argument, so bad that it’s nonsensical. You may say, why not tackle the best counter-arguments? Wouldn’t that make the case for the right to democracy a lot stronger? Sure it would, but I think it’s worthwhile to focus also on bad counter-arguments especially those that have some currency, as is the case with the counter-argument based on the right to self-determination.

Here it is: if we assert and enforce a right to democratic government on the international scene, we will violate people’s right to self-determination since a right to democratic government gives outsiders the right to intervene in other societies in order to bring about democracy. People, cultures and nations have a right to determine their form of government independently, and if they decide to adopt a non-democratic form of government we should allow them to do so since that is what their right to self-determination requires.

That looks quite reasonable at first sight, but the problem with this argument should still be obvious: self-determination and democracy are not two different things. If a nation determines that it should be governed in a non-democratic way, if determines away its self-determination. It’s one act of self-determination that renders all future acts of self-determination impossible. Promoting the right to democracy means promoting democracy; if outsiders promote democracy in a particular society, then they also de facto promote self-determination, not self-determination as a one-off self-destructive act, but self-determination as a permanent way of life.

free kosovoOpponents of the right to democracy may argue that if people reject democracy and want to exercise their self-determination in such a way that they forfeit self-determination, then they should be able to do so. Imposing democracy on them because of a misguided belief in the universal value and desirability of a right to democracy means imposing values and a culture that are alien to them. This is contrary to their right to self-determination. We must respect non-democratic governments and societies like we respect minority religious or cultural groups within a society. Even if there is such a thing as a right to democracy, people should be able to waive this right. And anyway, democracy won’t work when it is perceived as alien, because it requires active and motivated participation.

While I agree that real democracy is not imposed and must come from the inside, there is a difference between imposing and promoting. Democracy can’t be imposed but it can be promoted. And promoting it means allowing it to arise from the inside, and it can arise from the inside when people are told about it and when they get a taste of it; often the appetite only comes when you’ve already started eating. Furthermore, it’s nonsensical to speak about people rejecting something in the setting of a non-democratic government. How can we possibly know that people reject democracy if they don’t already have democracy?  Assuming that a society rejects democracy because some unelected representatives say this to the outside world and loudly claim a right to self-determination, is just plain silly. What these representatives really say is that they themselves reject democracy, and they obviously have good reasons to do so because democracy would be the end of them. If they talk about self-determination, it’s only their personal self-determination they care about.

Another unrelated but equally nonsensical concern about the right to democracy goes like this: democracies often violate the rights of minorities, so how can democracy be a human right if it conflicts with other human rights? As if different human rights don’t conflict all of the time, and as if it’s not an empirically verifiable fact that human rights are safest in democracies. Furthermore, this concern about the right to democracy assumes a simplistic model of democracy in which democracy equals majority rule. In fact, democracy is much more than that and includes – by definition – strong protections for the rights of minorities (such as constitutional protection, judicial review etc.). A realistic model of democracy also assumes that proper democratic government can’t function without respect for most if not all human rights. Hence, if democracy requires human rights, the supposed contradiction between democracy and rights loses a lot of its meaning.

More posts in this series are here.

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aid, equality, ethics of human rights, international relations, justice, philosophy, poverty

The Ethics of Human Rights (78): Our Duties to People in Other Countries

grover near and far

Grover, near and far

If we leave aside the minority view that we don’t have any moral duties to other people, as well as the somewhat more common view that we only have duties to a very limited group of people (our tribe, family or nation for example), then we end up accepting that we owe something to the rest of humanity. But what exactly? I don’t want to discuss whether we owe human beings in general the same as what we owe the people we know or the people we are associated with. What I’m interested in here is simply the nature of our obligations to “distant” people, and the basis or reasons of those obligations. Whether they’re stronger, weaker or just as strong as the obligations to “those nearer and dearer” is not the topic of this post (I have an older post about that).

1. What should we do? What are our obligations?

I think there are basically three types of obligations to distant others:

  • we have a duty to protect their human rights; this implies both abstaining from violating their rights and assisting them in the protection of their rights when those are violated (this is a legal duty)
  • we have a duty to create a more just global order (a duty of justice)
  • and we have a duty to act benevolently (a duty of beneficence).

1.1. Protect rights

This duty is in fact a set of different sub-duties:

  • A negative duty to stop violating rights ourselves. For example, if we apply a strict policy of closed borders, we violate certain rights of people in other countries (their freedom of movement, their right not to suffer poverty etc.). Our duties demand that we stop this policy.
  • A negative duty to stop assisting others who violate human rights. For example, the oppressive government of another country violates the rights of its citizens by means of weapons supplied by us (or by firms established in our country and exporting with our approval). Our duties demand that we stop assisting this government in this way.
  • A positive duty to intervene in order to stop human rights violations. For example, the West should have intervened when the Rwandan genocide was in progress.
  • A positive duty to intervene in order to prevent human rights violations. For example, the West should have intervened when it became clear that a genocide was about to occur in Rwanda.
  • A positive duty to intervene in order to create the preconditions for human rights. For example, when the institutions in other countries are dysfunctional or absent (in the case of failed or weak states) we have a duty to assist these countries’ efforts in institution building, so that they end up with institutions capable of protecting the rights of their citizens.
  • A positive duty to intervene in order to assist people’s efforts to overcome their poverty. Since poverty is a human rights violation, this is not really a separate duty: we shouldn’t create or aggravate poverty in other countries, we shouldn’t assist when others (e.g. foreign governments) create or aggravate poverty, and we have a duty to end and prevent poverty, and to create the institutions that make it possible to end and prevent poverty. However, I mention it separately because some of the specific means of intervention are peculiar to poverty, and don’t apply to other human rights (take for example development aid).

Our duties to intervene can cover

  • either only gross violations of some human rights (crimes against humanity, emergency action to alleviate widespread human suffering resulting from war, civil war, famine, drought, natural disasters or other humanitarian crises) – also called r2p
  • or violations of human rights in general.

Gross violations may warrant specific types of intervention that are not allowed for violations in general, for example military intervention. More mundane violations require other types of intervention, such as aid, conditional aid, diplomatic intervention, economic boycotts, universal jurisdiction etc. Intervention can also be either multilateral through the UN, or unilateral. Preferably it’s a legal form of intervention, but if necessary it can also be illegal – morality trumps law.

Uncles from the People's Liberation Army! Quickly go and liberate our little distressed friends in Taiwan, 1955

Uncles from the People’s Liberation Army! Quickly go and liberate our little distressed friends in Taiwan, 1955

1.2. Create a just global order

Perhaps we should do more than just rid the world of human rights violations and extreme poverty. The world is a very unequal place, and will continue to be so even when all human rights are protected and poverty has been eliminated (given a certain definition of poverty). So maybe we also have a duty to create a more egalitarian distribution of wealth, resources and/or opportunities across countries.

However, this duty is much more controversial than the previous one (1.1). Contrary to human rights violations, there is also no legal standard prohibiting an unjust and grossly unequal global order. Hence, given the uncertainty about this second type of duty, it’s safe to argue that we should take it to be a negative duty at most. In other words, we should not make the world more unequal and more unjust than it already is, and we should try to remove or improve institutions that make the world order unequal and unjust. More specifically, we have to

  • remove unfair trade agreements or trade restrictions
  • remove the current system of national border restrictions and allow freedom of movement
  • pay reparations or otherwise correct the lingering effects of a violent and exploitative history
  • improve economic regimes that make it impossible to have equal and fair access to natural resources
  • improve international institutions, shaped by the wealthy countries to their advantage
  • etc.

Obviously, many of these actions also remove human rights violations and are therefore covered by the first type of duty. However, even when they don’t they may be required by morality.

1.3. Act benevolently

peter singer

Peter Singer

The classic description of this duty is Peter Singer’s. He gives the example of a child drowning in a pool. We all believe that there’s a strong duty to save this child, even if there’s a certain cost to ourselves – e.g. it’ll ruin our expensive suit. The equivalent of the drowning child happens all the time in distant places, and there are systems in place that allow us to save people all over the world, at a cost that isn’t much higher than the price of a suit. In many cases, all we have to do is donate some money.

This duty to act benevolently can be interpreted more widely. It can involve more than the requirement to save people from disaster. Singer claims that it implies a radically egalitarian obligation: we ought to help others until the next increment of aid would do more good spent on ourselves than transferred to others. Practically, this means helping others until we are ourselves barely better off than the rest. This is extremely demanding, and very controversial, but the narrow interpretation of the duty of benevolence is widely shared.

Again, these three different duties are not always clearly different. There are overlaps. The duty to act benevolently is partly justified by the rights of the beneficiaries: a drowning child and a starving Ethiopian have a right to life. Creating a more just global order will improve respect for people’s rights, and improving respect for people’s rights will make the global order more just. Still, there are differences between these duties and it’s interesting for human rights activists to consider the possibility that people can appeal to moral obligations that go beyond respect for their human rights.

2. Why should we do what we should do? What is the basis of our obligations?

So, now that we stated what we should do, how can we explain why we should do those things? There may be different reasons why we have obligations to help other and distant people:

  • We may be responsible ourselves for their predicament (or at least partially): we may have violated their rights, helped others to violate their rights, or established and maintained an unjust international order (for example because we have been colonizers or because the international trade system that we have imposed is biased in our favor).
  • People have rights, and these rights by themselves create a duty for everyone else to respect and to promote respect for those rights. The duty to protect other people’s rights is not a duty only for those who are responsible for violating these rights. And neither is it a duty limited to those who have a special relationship with victims of rights violations or to those whose social duty it is to promote respect for rights (e.g. judges or police officers). We all have this duty, and we have it simply because others have rights. Hence, we pay taxes that fund the legal institutions that protect citizens against others who violate their rights, that fund schools and hospitals etc. There’s no reason to think that this does not apply globally as well.
  • We may have an obligation to help other and distant people not because their rights create a moral duty to assist, but because other moral values such as justice and/or benevolence or beneficence create such such a duty. If it is in our power to do something about suffering, injustice and inequality without too much of a sacrifice of our own interests and without violating some deontological demands (e.g. do not kill), then justice and/or benevolence may require that we do it.
  • Duties to help others can also be based on enlightened self-interest: national governments have a duty to protect the rights, security and prosperity of their own citizens, and in some cases this means protecting the rights, security and prosperity of people in other nations. The poor and oppressed may become refugees; civil wars may spread to other countries or may foster international terrorism; unstable economies may harm the global economic system and the environment etc. Conversely, free and prosperous nations benefit the rest of the world because of the gains of trade, cooperation in science and culture etc.
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freedom, law, philosophy, privacy

Types of Privacy

Marty Feldman in Young Frankenstein

Marty Feldman in Young Frankenstein

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In light of the recent hullabaloo over spying by the NSA, it’s useful to think a bit about the nature and justification of privacy. Privacy is a human right. It’s the right to seclude yourself or something about yourself and to restrict access by others to you own area of petty sovereignty. This area can have a bodily or physical dimension, but also an informational, relational or spatial one. Positively stated, the right to privacy is the right to appear in a selective and self-chosen way. (See also article 12 of the Universal Declaration).

Our understanding of this right is clouded because of the controversies about the exact borders of our private world and about what should or shouldn’t be a part of that world. Different people and different cultures at different times in history allow(ed) more or less intrusion, and opinions differ also about the need to reduce those borders as a means to protect other rights (security in an age of terrorism, free speech for investigative journalists etc.; more on the general problem of balancing different rights is here). The development of technology also makes it harder and harder to decide what should or shouldn’t be private (e.g. 50 years ago no one worried about DNA registers, gene patenting or CCTV).

Our understanding is also clouded because there are in fact many different types of privacy or different types of private worlds grouped under a single word: there’s the intimate, the domestic etc. Some types of privacy have a stronger moral claim than others, and the balancing with other non-privacy rights should also be done differently for different types of privacy. So there are in fact many different privacy rights.

Let’s have a look at some of the possible types of privacy and privacy rights. I’ll give you my own idiosyncratic classification consisting of 10 types. These types often overlap, of course, and the distinctions may seem a bit forced at times. Still, I think it’s useful to distinguish types of privacy because each type can be violated in a different way. In the list that follows, I’ll also mention some of the ways in which each type of privacy right can be violated. That doesn’t mean that all those violations are always unjustified. Some of them may be justified limitations of rights rather than violations.

1. Informational privacy

People have a right to decide what kind of undocumented information about themselves can be communicated, and how. Within limits of course. A criminal suspect can be forced to reveal some personal information (even if there’s a general right to remain silent). By default, however, people’s personal history or characteristics should remain secret. Examples of ways in which this type of privacy right can be violated are:

2. Mental privacy

A more specific version of information privacy is mental privacy. People have a right to keep their thoughts and feelings to themselves, given certain limitations. Violations of this right include:

  • workers who have to fill in a signed worker satisfaction survey
  • forced confessions.

3. Bodily privacy

Another more specific version of information privacy is bodily privacy, a type of privacy that serves to protect people’s intimacy. Violations of this right include:

4. Anonymity privacy

Yet another more specific version of information privacy is anonymity privacy. People have, in certain circumstances, the right to be unnoticed and unnamed. Violations of this right include:

  • people are required to have, carry and present identity cards
  • journalists are forced to reveal their sources
  • a ballot that isn’t secret.

5. Relational privacy

Another specific version of information privacy is relational privacy. People have a right to keep some of their relationships or some characteristics of some relationships secret. Violations of this right include:

6. Associational privacy

A subtype of relational privacy is associational privacy. Some associations have a right to keep some things secret. Violations of this right include:

  • a corporation is forced to divulge trade secrets, recipes, etc.
  • church communities are forced to grant access to their rites.

spying with binoculars

7. Activity privacy

A final version of information privacy is activity privacy. People have a right to move in public spaces without being noticed, tracked or named. Violations of this right include:

8. Residential or domestic privacy

Non-informational privacy includes residential or domestic privacy. People have a right to refuse access to their homes. Violations of this right include:

  • police officers searching someone’s house without a warrant
  • trespassing
  • stalking.

9. Property privacy

People have a right to exclude interference with their property. This right to property privacy overlaps with but is slightly different from the classic private property right in the sense that it can be violated without people’s property being taken away from them. Violations of this right include:

  • some forms of property searches by law enforcement officers
  • some forms of property prohibitions (e.g. obscene material).

10. Spatial privacy

People have a right to their own living space and the right to exclude others from this space, even if this space is not a house. Inmates, for example, although they don’t live in their own house and can’t regulate access to their cells, nevertheless have a right to spatial privacy. Violations of this right include:

  • prison conditions that are so bad that inmates have to live too close to each other
  • homelessness.

security vs privacy

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In the general scheme of spheres of life, our private world is not just distinct and separated from the sphere of government intervention, law and politics. It’s also distinct from the sphere of publicity and civil society, since we also have to be protected against violations of our privacy by fellow citizens.

The private sphere can be divided in 4 sub-spheres: the self/mind, the body, the home/space and relationships/associations. Each sub-sphere would cover 1 or more of the 10 types of privacy:

  • the self/mind sphere covers informational privacy, mental privacy, anonymity privacy, activity privacy and property privacy
  • the body sphere covers informational privacy and bodily privacy
  • the home/space sphere covers residential or domestic privacy as well as spatial and property privacy
  • the relationships/association sphere covers relational and associational privacy.

Here’s a drawing:

spheres of life 2

In this drawing, the sphere of law intrudes slightly into the private sphere because privacy isn’t an absolute right and people need to be protected against violence and domination in the domestic sphere.

In the examples given above of invasions into the private sphere, I haven’t expressed my opinion on the legitimacy of those invasion. All I claimed was that the right to privacy isn’t absolute and that some limitations/violations of that right will be necessary. If we look again at the drawing above, I can now give some examples of what I believe are illegitimate invasions of certain sub-spheres of the private sphere:

  1. spheres of life 3unlawful house searches by the police force
  2. unlawful house searches by the police force, combined with unlawful body searches
  3. excessively intrusive security checks and body scans outside of the home (e.g. at the airport); excessive use of DNA registers; unauthorized access to medical records
  4. publication of embarrassing personal facts; forced confessions
  5. criminalization of consensual sex between adults
  6. criminalization of gay or interracial marriage; publication of addresses of convicted pedophiles
  7. excessive regulation of private associations (businesses, churches etc.); journalists being forced to reveal their sources.

See also this previous post on the subject.

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discrimination, economics, equality

Discrimination (16): When Is It OK to Discriminate?

hippies use side door

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Discrimination is generally blameworthy and therefore often illegal as well. However, there are situations in which it’s acceptable to discriminate and unacceptable to legislate against discrimination. I’m not referring to rules that apply unequally to different people in order to produce a more equal outcome, such as rules regarding affirmative action (which are sometimes claimed to be a form of positive discrimination); nor am I referring to rules regarding different height requirements for male and female candidate police officers. These are two examples of rules that discriminate in order to make outcomes more equal, and they can therefore, paradoxically, be seen as anti-discriminatory. Conversely, rules that apply equally to all can have a “disparate impact“: e.g. one uniform and “neutral” height requirement for police officers would mean that fewer women will be allowed in the police force and would therefore have a discriminatory impact on women. Even if such rules are not intended to discriminate against women, they obviously do. (I’ll come back to intent in discrimination at the end of this post).

So, I’m thinking about rules like those, or rules that not only have unequal outcomes but also apply unequally (take the rules against gay marriage for instance). Can some such rules, which clearly discriminate some groups of people (given a certain understanding of discrimination), ever be justified?

I think they can. Discrimination can be unobjectionable if the benefits outweigh the harm done by discrimination. “Benefits” meaning not the benefits from the discriminator’s point of view, since those always, by definition, outweigh the harms for others – that’s the point of discrimination. We have to look at the benefits generally speaking, from a neutral point of view. For example, the safety of airline passengers and hence their rights to life and physical security outweigh the discrimination imposed on people who are not allowed to be pilots because of their bad eyesight. Another example: the importance of a good education for our children outweighs the discrimination imposed on people who want to be teachers but don’t have the qualifications. Discrimination of people with a physical disability or intellectual deficiencies is acceptable and even beneficial in these cases, not because those who can become pilots and teachers benefit from the exclusion of rivals, but because society as a whole benefits, and because this benefit outweighs the harm done to those excluded.

glassesThe downside of the consequentialist balancing inherent in these examples is that it is seldom clear what the exact harms and benefits of discrimination are. After all, every historical instance of discrimination was once defended on the basis of its beneficial consequences: equal voting rights for women was supposed to lead to irrational politics; legalization of homosexuality would lead to immorality; miscegenation would lead to the downfall of the white race etc. However, these examples don’t prove that there can’t be any forms of discrimination that can have some real and overridingbenefits, and in fact we daily assume that they have: we give good teachers a job as a teacher, we give talented people higher wages etc. because we believe that society as a whole benefits from this.

Maybe we shouldn’t talk about discrimination in cases of acceptable and beneficial discrimination. I argued here that we should probably limit the concept to those cases in which the equal rights of those who are discriminated are violated and, more specifically, are violated for no other reason than their membership of a socially salient group. The would-be pilots and teachers in the examples above don’t have an equal right to be pilots or teachers or to any other specific job. There is no such right. There is a general right to work, but that right isn’t violated since people with bad eyesight or without the qualifications to become good teachers have ample opportunities to find a job elsewhere (under normal economic conditions).

Also the second condition for discrimination is absent in these examples: the people in question are certainly not part of socially salient groups (which is another way of saying that people with bad eyesight or without the qualifications to become good teachers are not regularly put at a disadvantage in society). Hence they are not discriminated when they are excluded from certain jobs on the basis of qualifications.

If, however, the would-be pilots and teachers were black – and therefore part of a socially salient group – and if they were excluded for no other reason than their skin color, and if this exclusion would violate their right to work (or any other right), then there would be discrimination. Their exclusion would violate their right to work when they regularly face this kind of exclusion, not when that sort of things happens only exceptionally and when they therefore have ample opportunities elsewhere.

employment discriminationThis last point about alternative opportunities is crucial. Single instances of discrimination usually don’t violate people’s rights and therefore aren’t really discrimination according to the definition given here. Discrimination requires violations of people’s rights and violations based on people’s membership in socially salient groups. And violations of rights imply the absence of alternative opportunities  (I once gave the example of one lonely restaurant owner refusing to serve blacks, or the isolated landlord refusing to rent a house to Italian immigrants).

In this older post I argued that forcing some people to stop discriminating would violate their rights, such as their right to free association, to property, to religion etc. and that it can only be acceptable to force them to stop if the discrimination they inflict is so widespread and historically deep that it limits the rights and options of the targets of discrimination.

Nevertheless, this rule still leaves us with a few hard cases. The rights of discriminators may still receive priority even when the discrimination does severely limit the options and rights of target groups. Suppose there’s a general disapproval to marry “outside of one’s race” among the majority white population in a society. Most of us would not want legislation against this kind of discrimination because that would drastically limit the right to marry of the discriminators. Discrimination here severely impacts the choices and opportunities of non-whites, and yet seems acceptable. The whites in question may be immoral and repugnant, but this doesn’t render their rights null and void and doesn’t justify legislation prohibiting an exclusive preference for white husbands and wives. The reason, I think, is that it’s very difficult to do something about the actions of the whites. You can force people to hire blacks, serve them in your restaurant, admit them in your school etc. But you can’t force people to marry someone. So, the system I set up here to separate cases of discrimination from other cases isn’t perfect. It won’t solve some hard cases, but maybe those can never be solved.

A final word about intent. There’s no mention of intent in the definition of discrimination given here. That means that rules with a disparate impact can be cases of wrongful discrimination even if there is no intent to discriminate. Take again the case of height requirements for police officers: a single height requirement for both genders is not necessarily discriminatory, but when it is part of a wider social pattern of gender inequality, then it may violate women’s equal rights because the total set of gender biased rules makes it difficult for women to have ample employment opportunities elsewhere. Women are then a socially salient group. Intent is irrelevant here. Even if the height requirement is motivated by efficiency reasons, it contributes to discrimination and rights violations. The goal of anti-discrimination is equal protection of rights, whatever the causes of rights violations.

Now, imagine the height requirement isn’t part of a wider pattern of gender inequality. In that case, women have ample opportunities elsewhere and their equal right to work is therefore not violated. Hence there is no discrimination.

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democracy, what is democracy?

What is Democracy? (68): The Expression and Aggregation of Bullshit?

bullshit

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Here’s a piece of news that’s both disconcerting and inspiring. We already knew that electorates in democracies are heavily polarized (although we also know that public opinion polls tend to exaggerate the distance and divisions between political groups). Polarization leaves democratic outcomes at the mercy of the undecided and the often clueless middle, ready to be swayed by irrelevant and irrational considerations. However, polarization is not only bad for democracy, it’s also bad for the polarized: if the distance to another opinion is too large, you’ll never be persuaded, and people who are never persuaded are a sad kind of being.

The news is this: apparently, the polarization that we witness is only skin deep. People often express partisan and biased ideas not because they really believe them but as a means to signal affiliation, trustworthiness and identity. In other words: they are bullshitting. Alex Tabarrok wrote:

I am for betting because I am against bullshit. Bullshit is polluting our discourse and drowning the facts. A bet costs the bullshitter more than the non-bullshitter so the willingness to bet signals honest belief. A bet is a tax on bullshit …

A recent paper provides evidence. It’s well known that Democrats and Republicans give different answers to even basic factual questions when those questions are politically loaded (Did inflation fall under Reagan? Were WMDs found in Iraq? and so forth). But do the respondents really believe their answers or are they simply signalling their affiliations? In other words, are respondents bullshitting? In a new paper, Bullock, Gerber, Huber and Hill provide evidence that the respondents don’t actually believe what they say and the authors do so by making partisans pay for their beliefs. (source)

Dylan Matthews:

Those in the control group were asked basic factual questions about politics; those in the treatment group were asked the same questions but were entered into a raffle for an Amazon gift card wherein their chances depended on how many questions they got right.

In the control group, … [t]here are big partisan gaps in the accuracy of responses. … But when there was money on the line, the size of the gaps shrank by 55 percent. (source)

Hence, it seems possible that people are able, given the right conditions, to stop the bullshit and to persuade each other of certain matters of fact. Hence we should be able to reduce polarization and to improve the workings of democracy and of public discourse in general.

The big caveat here is “given the right conditions”. Those conditions are only rarely in place in actual democracies. Normally, when people vote they don’t get paid to vote (and neither do they have to pay to vote). In a certain sense, that’s a good thing: vote-buying is objectionable (as are the property conditions that used to decide who has a right to vote and that were in a sense a price imposed on voting). In another sense, however, it’s a pity that people don’t get paid to vote. The study above shows that if people get some money when their votes are not based on factual mistakes they will tend not to make those mistakes.

If we want democracy to be more than the expression and aggregation of bullshit, we may have to consider paying people to vote.

More posts in this series here.

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causes of income inequality, economics, work

The Causes of Wealth Inequality (26): The Length of Your First Name

My_name_is_bruce

Incredible.

On average, the shorter your first name, the more you will earn. In fact, the data show each extra letter “costs” you about $3,600 in annual salary. (source)

Online job matching site TheLadders has six million members … and a lot of salary data. For Mothers’ Day, the company decided to sort and analyze its information to see whether what our parents call us impacts our earning potential. (source)

More, and I think more serious posts in this series are here.

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equality, gender discrimination

Gender Discrimination (34): Public Opinion on Domestic Violence

domestic violence

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One can, to some extent, understand – but not condone! – men who approve of domestic violence. After all, they may have good self-interested reasons to engage in it (power is useful). However, the level of female acquiescence is just baffling:

On average, 29 percent of women in countries with data concurred that wife beating was justified for arguing with the husband, 25 percent for refusing to have sex, and 21 percent for burning food. In Guinea, 60 percent of women found it permissible to be beaten for refusing to have sex with their spouses. In Ethiopia, 81 percent of women say that it is justified for a husband to beat his wife for at least one of the reasons listed in the Demographic and Health Surveys; 61 percent reported violence to be appropriate for burning food and 59 percent for arguing with their husbands. (source, source)

More about domestic violence. More posts in this series.

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democracy, human rights violations, what is democracy?

What is Democracy? (67): The Form of Government That Offers the Best Protection Against Human Rights Violations

democracy

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There is a clear correlation between the presence and quality of democratic government in a country and the level of respect for human rights in that country. That may sound obvious but it’s good to have some measured results. This paper for instance offers some clear evidence:

There is a substantial body of research devoted to understanding the relationship between democracy and government human rights performance. Most research centers on physical integrity rights but does not analyze the broader civil liberties encompassed by the category of “empowerment rights.” The dynamics of the relationship between the degree of democracy in a state and protection of empowerment rights might be different and improvements may take longer to emerge. This study examines the effects of democracy and democratic duration on empowerment rights scores, and it also uncovers time thresholds at which different scores are attained. The results show that regime type is more critical to the protection of empowerment rights than it is to physical integrity rights. Even in the earliest years of democracy there is a positive relationship between democracy and empowerment rights, but empowerment rights strengthen as countries gain democratic experience. …

Thus, countries with more institutionalized democratic regimes, as determined by the quality and longevity of democratic experience, are significantly more likely to respect both fundamental human rights and broader classes of civil liberties. … [A]lthough human rights protection is present in early years, it will usually be even greater after countries have had extended experience with democracy. (source)

Two graphs to back this up:

correlation between democracy and human rights

correlation between democracy and human rights

(source, click image to enlarge)

Here and here are other papers giving some further evidence.

The interesting thing about all this is not that there is a correlation – anyone following the news could have guessed as much. What we should care about are the reasons why there is a correlation. From the studies cited above we can see that the most important causal link is the one going from democracy to respect for human rights. In other words, there is a correlation because democracy causes respect for human rights. Vice versa may also be possible, although the argument is probably weaker. And then there may also be a hidden variable that can partially explain the correlation. For example, it may well be that prosperity and high GDP promote both democracy and human rights.

But then the next question is: how does democracy cause higher levels of respect for human rights? I guess this can happen in several ways:

  • Democracies are more likely to be systems based on the rule of law and the rule of law is necessary for the protection of human rights.
  • Democratic rulers know that they can’t get away with repression. They’ll be voted out if they try, or, worse, they’ll suffer the consequences of the rule of law, imposed on them by other branches of power in a system of checks and balances and separation of powers.
  • Democracies have systems of judicial review which allow courts to void legislation that contradicts basic constitutional rights.
  • Democracies have powerful non-violent mechanisms for dispute settlement, such as well-functioning courts. People don’t need to take the law into their own hands. Internal peace and limitations on violent behavior have beneficial effects on a number of human rights.
  • Democracy is correlated with high levels of prosperity, and prosperity makes it easier to promote respect for human rights. Rights cost money.
  • Democracies need human rights to function adequately (no democracy without free speech, free assembly, free association etc.), so they have an added incentive to respect them.

None of the above is meant to imply the following:

  1. That we can delay the implementation of human rights norms in non-democratic states. Remember the remark at the beginning that the causal link probably goes in two opposite directions and that human rights can promote democratic government. After all, if people are allowed to express themselves, they will express themselves about the workings of their government, and that is the first step towards democracy.
  2. That rights are never violated in democracies or never respected in non-democracies. It’s merely a matter of probability.
  3. That there are no elements other than democracy that promote human rights. Of course there must be. I mentioned prosperity a moment ago. Democracy is not a sufficient condition, although probably a necessary one, at least in the long run, for the full set of human rights and for the equal enjoyment of all rights by all people.
  4. That the beneficial effect of democracy on human rights is equal for all human rights or for all types of democracy. Well-developed and long-lasting democracies do better, as mentioned above, but perhaps also deep democracies, meaning democracies that provide a wide range of opportunities for democratic say.

More about the link between democracy and human rights here, here, here and here. More posts in this series are here.

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