Another example of good intentions going wrong:
One of the many puzzles surrounding Muammar Qaddafi was his refusal to go into exile. Once NATO intervened on behalf of the rebels and Tripoli fell, Qaddafi must have known that he would eventually lose the war and that this would mean death. Instead of leaving the country, he decided to stay.
Why? One surprising answer has to do with the International Criminal Court. It used to be that exile was an attractive long-term option for dictators to take. Rather than stay and fight, they could live their lives in wealth and comfort in beautiful and stable places such as Paris or the Bahamas.
This changed as more and more countries ratified the Rome Statute of the ICC. Now seeking asylum is no longer easy or particularly attractive. Dictators can try to convince countries such as France, Britain, Venezuela, Mexico or Spain to let them settle in their capital cities or along their coastlines. But since all have ratified Rome, moving there is tantamount to turning oneself in to be prosecuted for war crimes. Qaddafi could seek refuge in countries that have not yet ratified Rome, such as the United States or Cuba or Zimbabwe or Sudan or Saudi Arabia. But those countries are either unwilling to accept him (the U.S. and Saudi Arabia) or unable to credibly commit to protecting him over time (Cuba, Zimbabwe, Sudan). How long could Qaddafi trust that the current regime in Cuba or Zimbabwe will remain in power to protect him? …
What Qaddafi’s behavior reveals is a potentially unexpected and unfortunate side-effect of an increasingly successful ICC. By limiting the options nasty dictators have to seek exile, it is increasingly forcing them to stay. And by forcing them to stay, it could, inadvertently, be encouraging war. (source)
More on the ICC here. More self-defeating human rights policies here.

This argument is one lacking any real evidence. Dictators usually don’t go into exile until they literally have no other choice – that is, until they’ve been chased out of the country upon threat of imprisonment or death. (See, eg, Idi Amin). Just as many don’t even flee then (see, eg, Manuel Noriega). Similarly, the only thing that will lever the Mugabes and Bashirs of this world out of office is the threat of immediate violent overthrow, ICC or no ICC.
The ICC can afford to be patient and, in the end, it will get the chance to try rogue leaders. Milosevic, Karadzic and Mladic all ended up in front of one of the ICC’s predecessors, the ICTY, and more leaders will be so tried in the future.
If it’s true that Gaddafi would have fled the country if it weren’t for the ICC, I think it’s equally true that his flight would have happened only when the enemy was at his door and flight was his only remaining option. That is, in an ICC-less world he would have fled Libya at the same time anyway. Such is the mentality of most dictators – they cling to power until they literally can’t hang on any more. There have been exceptions, but they were few and far between, even before international courts and tribunals.
With scant evidence to suggest that an ICC-less world would actually result in dictators who are entrenched in power giving it up, it’s hard to understand how people wish for a time when the Idi Amins of this world could wreak unspeakable havoc on their populations and then, when the wolves were at their door, flee to a life of luxury, safe from justice.
Just to follow up yesterday’s comment, former Ivory Coast President Laurent Gbagbo has today been transferred to the Hague for trial before the International Criminal Court: tgr.ph/sggqJ9